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Introduction
Various explanations have been advanced for the persis‑
tent under‑performance of agriculture in many African 
countries, where smallholder farming is still the dominant 
livelihood activity and  the main  source  of  employment, 
food  and  income.  Some  of  the  oldest  arguments 
remain the most compelling. African farmers face harsh 
agro‑ecologies and erratic weather, characterised  by 
low  soil  fertility,  recurrent  droughts  and/or  floods, 
and  increasingly unpredictable weather patterns associ‑
ated with climate change. Vulnerability to shocks  is 
compounded by infrastructure deficits (roads and trans‑
port networks, telecommunications, potable water and 
irrigation) that keep poor communities poor and vulner‑
able, as testified by  the phenomenon observed during 
livelihood crises of steep  food price gradients  from 
isolated  rural  villages  to  densely  settled  urban  centres. 
African  farmers  have  also  been inadequately protected 
against the forces of globalisation and adverse interna‑
tional terms of trade – for instance, Western farmers and 
markets are heavily protected in ways that African farmers 
and markets are not.
Finally,  African  agriculture  has  been  the  subject  of 
numerous  experiments  –  strategies, policies, 
programmes  and  projects  –  from  ‘Integrated  Rural 
Development  Programmes’ (IRDPs)  in  the 1960s  to 
‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’  (PRSPs)  in  the 1990s. 
Perhaps the most  significant  intervention  of  the  last 
half‑century  was  agricultural  liberalisation, promoted 
under the ‘structural adjustment’ reform umbrella during 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Following inconclusive evidence on the impacts of 
these policy reform processes, the debate continues over 
whether agricultural  liberalisation was a good  idea badly 
implemented by ‘refusenik’ African governments, or a 
bad idea doomed to fail, that was imposed on African 
governments  against  their  better  judgement  and 
against  the  interests  of  their  poor  and vulnerable 
citizens, many of whom are small farmers. This debate is 
relevant to our topic, since government interventions in 
agriculture (pre‑liberalisation) were motivated by 
concerns to achieve household and national food secu‑
rity, both by supporting agricultural growth and by 
protecting farmers against agricultural risks and market 
failures. Social Protection for Agricultural Growth in Africa 
Accelerated  progress  towards  achieving  the  Millennium 
Development  Goals  in  Africa requires substantial and 
sustained increases in agricultural growth. Obviously, 
this implies investments by governments, donors and 
farmers themselves in yield‑enhancing technologies, 
human capital (education and health) and improved 
farming systems. Less obviously, it also implies invest‑
ments in social safety nets – or social protection, broadly 
defined – targeted at small farmers. All four factors 
explaining agricultural under‑performance identified 
above (and  there are many others, such as  the multiple 
impacts on agriculture of  the HIV/AIDS pandemic), are 
amenable to social protection interventions. Erratic 
weather can be withstood through  effective  social  insur‑
ance mechanisms.  Infrastructure  deficits  can  be 
addressed through public works projects. Western 
protectionism is a form of state social protection for their 
farmers that has been replicated in Africa in the past. 
Liberalisation’s excessive faith in free markets can be 
countered with judicious interventions by the state, 
parastatal agencies or sub‑contracted private sector 
actors, to correct for market failures.
The most effective strategies for reducing poverty are 
those that raise the economic returns to the productive 
assets that the poor use to make their livelihoods, specifi‑
cally their labour and, in rural areas, their land. This paper 
argues that investing in social protection for farmers can 
raise the productivity of their labour and farmland, and 
is therefore an  investment  in poverty  reduction  and 
pro‑poor  economic  growth,  but  that  the  social  protec‑
tion  agenda has  so  far  failed  to  engage  seriously with 
the  opportunities  for  building  synergies with 
agriculture. 
Section 2 of this paper identifies linkages between 
social safety nets and agriculture, firstly by  sketching 
the  conceptual  evolution  from  ‘safety nets’  to  ‘social 
protection’  (2.1),  then by  examining  synergies  and 
conflicts  between  social  protection  and  agricultural 
policy (2.2), next considering how social protection was 
delivered to farmers in the past (2.3), and the  limitations 
for African  farmers  of  the  ‘new  social  protection  agenda’ 
(2.4).  Section  3 disaggregates alternative social protec‑
tion  instruments  that can contribute  to agricultural 
growth into Sen’s four ‘entitlement’ categories – produc‑
tion (3.1), labour (3.2), trade (3.3) and transfers (3.4). 
Section 4 concludes.
Social Safety Nets, Social 
Protection and Agriculture
From ‘social safety nets’ to ‘social 
protection’ 
A cursory appreciation of the key differences between 
social safety nets and social protection can be seen by 
comparing the World Bank’s constantly evolving defini‑
tions of each term. In the 1990 World Development 
Report, the World Bank defined social safety nets – the 
third prong of  the  ‘New Poverty Agenda’  – as  “some 
form of  income  insurance  to help people through 
short‑term stress and calamities” (World Bank 1990: 90). 
It follows that safety nets are preoccupied more with 
vulnerability than with chronic poverty; indeed, one 
critique of the 1990s safety nets agenda was that the 
logical target group for safety nets support is not the 
poor, but people at risk of becoming poor following a 
future shock – an effective safety net protects the assets 
of people who have assets against impoverishment and 
destitution, it pays much less attention to people who 
have no assets at all. During the 1990s, the World Bank’s 
conceptualisation of safety nets broadened, and in 1996 
a two‑pronged definition was proposed that incorpo‑
rated measures to address both chronic poverty and 
vulnerability:
Safety nets are programs which protect a person 
or household against  two adverse outcomes  in 
welfare:  chronic  incapacity  to work  and  earn  
(chronic  poverty);  and  a decline in this capacity 
from a marginal situation that provides minimal 
livelihood for survival with few reserves (transient 
poverty) (Subbarao et al. 1997: 2).
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This definition edges closer towards the more holistic 
view that would soon be embodied in notions of social 
protection, and away from its antecedents in narrower 
notions of safety nets  as no more  than protection  against 
shocks.  In 2000,  the World Bank defined  social protec‑
tion as “public interventions to assist individuals, house‑
holds and communities better manage risk, and to 
provide support to the critically poor” (Holzmann and 
Jørgensen, 2000: 2). The  similarities with  the  Bank’s 
own  definition  of  ‘safety  nets’  from  just  4  years  earlier 
are striking. When this definition was elaborated into a 
policy framework known as ‘social risk management’, 
which rapidly became a hegemonic framework under‑
pinning the social protection agenda, the World Bank 
identified a number of objectives that a comprehensive 
approach needs to address:
Social Risk Management (SRM) consists of a collec‑
tion of public measures intended to assist indi‑
viduals, households and communities in managing 
risks in order to reduce vulnerability, improve 
consumption smoothing, and enhance equity while 
contributing to economic development in a partici‑
patory manner (World Bank 1999).
Interestingly,  this  focus  on  “managing  risks  in  order 
to  reduce  vulnerability ... while contributing  to  economic 
development”  implies  a  return  to  the  earlier  ‘safety 
nets’ preoccupation with risks and shocks, and a recogni‑
tion that interventions targeted at risk management 
could  be  instrumental  in  securing  economic  growth 
objectives.  Conversely, the ‘chronic poverty’ component 
which implied providing support to the ‘critically poor’ 
is neglected  in the SRM approach, tacitly endorsing the 
deeply sceptical views of many poor country govern‑
ments who regard social assistance for their poorest 
citizens as unnecessary (“the poor  look after each other”, 
“public transfers will only crowd out private transfers”) 
and fiscally unsustainable.
In  fact,  three distinct  sets of  strategies were  identi‑
fied by  the World Bank  for delivering ‘social  risk manage‑
ment’:  (1)  risk  reduction:  ex ante measures  to promote 
livelihoods  (eg microfinance, free education); (2) risk 
mitigation: ex ante measures to reduce income variance 
if a shock occurs (eg insurance, pensions); (3) risk coping: 
ex post alleviation of impacts of shocks (food aid, 
borrowing, emergency cash transfers) (Holzmann and 
Kozel 2007). None of these strategies or instruments 
appears to address the needs of the chronically poor 
who are already living on the margins of survival, whether 
a shock occurs or not. On the other hand, a focus on 
livelihood shocks does imply a concern with supporting 
farmers, given that agriculture is the dominant sector in 
most African economies and that agricultural risk is a 
major driver of poverty and a drag on agricultural invest‑
ment and growth.
The emergence and rapid ascendancy of  ‘social 
protection’  in the early 2000s as an arena within develop‑
ment policy challenged earlier notions such as  ‘safety 
nets’  in a number of fundamental  respects.  Firstly, 
whereas  social  safety  nets  were  dismissed  as  ‘residu‑
alist’ (providing last resort assistance for people left out 
of growth processes), social protection is a more holistic 
approach that should be mainstreamed into 
development policy. Secondly, while ‘safety nets’ were 
often implemented in paternalistic and stigmatising ways 
(evoking images of food handouts and ‘make‑work’ 
public works), social protection is better able to respond 
to articulated needs (by involving participating commu‑
nities in the design, targeting and  monitoring  of  social 
transfer  programmes).  Thirdly,  social  safety  nets  were 
often criticised as causing ‘dependency’ (because of 
moral hazard and other behavioural effects) and were 
therefore unpopular with governments, but ‘transforma‑
tive social protection’ aims to empower poor and vulner‑
able people by adding rights and social justice to the 
menu, in addition to social transfers (Sabates‑Wheeler 
and Devereux, 2007). Fourthly, it follows that social 
protection can be politically challenging or even radical 
(since it implies empowering citizens to claim their 
entitlements from the state), in contrast to the critique 
of social safety nets that they are politically conservative 
(in Latin America in the 1980s, safety nets were charac‑
terised as supporting a neo‑liberal economic liberalisa‑
tion agenda, by buying off local resistance to unpopular 
structural adjustment reforms).
Finally,  and  perhaps  of  greatest  relevance  to  this 
paper,  social  safety  nets were  seen  as offering only 
consumption support to poor and vulnerable people 
– a form of basic social welfare  for countries  too poor 
and administratively weak  to deliver comprehensive 
social welfare systems – and were  therefore  regarded 
as an  inefficient and expensive allocation of scarce public 
resources that could be more productively  invested  in 
income‑generating sectors  (this  resonates  with  the 
‘macro‑level  conflict’  identified  above).  By  contrast, 
big  claims are being made by proponents of the new 
social protection agenda about its potential to contribute 
to economic growth and poverty reduction, because of 
multiplier effects and linkages between ‘livelihood 
protection’ and ‘livelihood promotion’ outcomes (as 
discussed below).
Agriculture and social protection: syner-
gies and conflicts
Devereux  et  al.  (2008)  identify  a  number  of  actual 
and  potential  synergies  and  conflicts between small‑
holder agricultural policies and social protection policies 
in Africa. In terms of  macro‑level  synergies,  effective 
investments  in  agriculture  should  promote  growth in 
agricultural  production  and  rural  incomes, with  two 
beneficial  implications  for  social protection: firstly, 
economic growth  increases the public resources avail‑
able for financing social protection; secondly, pro‑poor 
growth in incomes reduces social protection needs. In 
terms of macro‑level conflicts, agricultural and social 
protection policies typically compete for  limited  financial 
resources  and political  influence,  since  they  tend  to 
be  regarded by governments and donors as distinct 
rather  than complementary policy sectors, and  their 
implementation is often uncoordinated and internally 
contradictory.
At the micro‑level, synergies can be achieved from 
social protection to agriculture: effective investments in 
social protection help the rural poor to reduce seasonal 
cash–flow bottlenecks; expand their assets for self–in‑
surance and mutual insurance; use their productive 
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assets more efficiently; and adopt higher return liveli‑
hood activities. Also at the micro‑level, conflicts often 
reflect bad design and are therefore avoidable – for 
instance, social protection can undermine incentives  for 
investment  in agriculture  (eg  food aid might depress 
food production and market development; participation 
in badly timed employment–based safety nets conflicts 
with own–farm labour requirements). Success in one 
policy arena can create problems in the other: policies 
that stimulate agriculture (eg by raising food prices to 
incentivise production) could increase the vulnerability 
of  others (eg market‑dependent poor food 
consumers).
Until  fairly  recently  a  sharp  conceptual  and  policy 
separation was  often  drawn  between livelihood protec‑
tion mechanisms (such as ‘safety nets’ or ‘social protec‑
tion’) and livelihood promotion mechanisms  (eg 
investment  in  agriculture  or  job  creation). This  separa‑
tion  is now acknowledged to be artificial and flawed. 
Many interventions have both ‘protection’ and ‘promo‑
tion’ objectives and/or outcomes. Two classic (if contro‑
versial) examples are public works, which  transfers cash 
or  food  to participants while building essential physical 
and economic  infrastructure, and school  feeding, which 
transfers  food  to poor children while investing  in  their 
education and building  their human capital  for more 
productive  future livelihoods. Both these social protec‑
tion instruments have potential positive synergies with 
agriculture. Many assets created by public works support 
agriculture directly  (eg soil and water conservation) or 
indirectly  (eg  feeder  road construction  links  farmers 
to  input and output markets,  and  contributes  to  stabil‑
ising  food  supplies  and  prices).  As  for  school feeding, 
empirical  evidence  from Asia  has  shown  that  educated 
farmers  produce  higher yields and earn higher incomes 
than their illiterate neighbours.
It could even be argued that the absence of effective 
social protection (especially insurance) is partly respon‑
sible  for  the perpetuation of chronic poverty, stagnating 
yields and acute vulnerability in rural Africa. Dorward 
and Kydd (2002) argue that the presence of uninsured 
risk  lowers rural productivity  in  three ways:  (1) by 
reducing returns  to  investment,  (2) by encouraging 
investment  in  risk‑reducing  rather  than  income‑max‑
imising  activities,  (3)  by discouraging investment alto‑
gether, because of low and unpredictable returns in a 
context where investors are likely to be risk averse. The 
corollary of these disincentive effects is that effective 
social safety nets or insurance should raise returns to 
investment and encourage investment  in higher  return 
activities, and  there  is  substantial evidence of  these 
positive synergies between agriculture and social protec‑
tion in a variety of contexts from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. 
The key to meeting the challenge posed by the title 
of this paper – ‘targeting social safety nets  to  support 
agricultural  growth’  –  is  to maximise  the  synergies 
between  agricultural policy and social protection instru‑
ments, and to minimise the conflicts or trade‑offs.
Social protection for African farmers: from 
‘old’ to ‘new’ agendas
From  roughly  the  1960s  to  the  1980s,  social  safety 
net  interventions  in  many  African countries were 
informed by a nuanced understanding of the vulnerabili‑
ties faced by small farmers,  and  the  emphasis was  on 
assisting  farmers  to  reduce  risk  pre‑emptively,  or  to 
manage the consequences of risk after shocks occurred. 
Smallholders were the main target group for a cluster of 
social assistance and social insurance mechanisms, 
among which were the following, which could be labelled 
the ‘old social protection agenda’:
Strategic grain reserve management: Government  •
parastatals maintained sizeable buffer stocks of the 
national staple food, which was purchased locally if 
surpluses were available and distributed as  food aid 
or  released onto  the market at cost price  to stabilise 
food prices during the ‘hungry season’ or a more severe 
food crisis.
Food pricing policies: Recognising that farmers’ liveli‑ •
hoods are undermined by low food prices, and that 
food security of market‑dependent consumers is 
compromised by high food prices, governments set a 
‘floor’ price below which parastatals would not 
purchase produce from farmers and a ‘ceiling’ price 
above which they would not sell food, anywhere in 
the country (‘pan‑territorial’) or at any time of year 
(‘pan‑seasonal’).
Input subsidies: On the principle that it is more cost‑ef‑ •
fective to subsidise food production than food 
consumption (in landlocked Malawi, for instance, it 
costs more to import maize than to subsidise fertiliser 
to produce an equivalent tonnage), many African 
governments initiated  programmes  designed  to 
ensure  farmers’  access  to  yield‑enhancing  inputs 
– especially fertiliser and seed – or subsidised credit 
to purchase these inputs.
Parastatal marketing agencies: Many of these  •
programmes and instruments were managed by agri‑
cultural marketing parastatals, which set prices, acted 
as monopoly  importer of inputs and monopoly buyer 
from  farmers  (traders were sometimes banned,  to 
prevent competition). These parastatals pursued an 
explicit food security mandate, through their subsi‑
dised sales of inputs and food and guaranteed purchase 
of outputs, operating ‘social markets’ that were often 
unprofitable but ensured that farmers in the smallest, 
remotest villages were reached.
sand/or cash transfers wherever  local markets and 
cultural contexts  (specifically gender relations) permit 
this; (6) declare a moratorium on temporary small‑scale 
‘pilot projects’, and support permanent national  social 
transfer programmes  that  are  integrated  into  agricul‑
tural  and broader development policies.
Although some of these issues are being addressed 
in an ad hoc manner in African countries, the  potential 
for  social  protection  –  especially  ‘productivity‑en‑
hancing  safety  nets’  –  to contribute to agricultural 
growth has yet to be fully exploited in a systematic, 
coherent and coordinated way.
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Limitations of the ‘new social protection 
agenda’ for African farmers  
Social protection was the offspring of two parents: 
(non‑emergency) safety nets and (emergency) humani‑
tarian relief. In Africa, humanitarian relief has been domi‑
nated by emergency food aid during  livelihood  crises 
such  as drought  or  ‘complex political  emergencies’, 
and  has largely been delivered by  the  international 
community, which  continues  to dominate  the design, 
delivery and  financing of social protection, and  to drive 
this agenda  in particular directions. Social safety nets 
are sometimes government‑owned (eg social pensions, 
disability grants, war veterans pensions), sometimes 
donor‑financed and NGO‑implemented (eg school 
feeding and public works projects), and sometimes 
co‑owned (eg social funds).
Although social protection is a broader concept and 
offers a more diverse menu in theory, social  protection 
in  practice  has  yet  to  escape  its  genesis  in  humani‑
tarian  relief  and conventional safety nets. For instance, 
the ‘Social Risk Management’ framework identifies a 
range of possible responses to a range of risks, yet in 
countries like Malawi and Ethiopia the path from emer‑
gency relief to social protection is remarkably short. In 
Malawi, innovations in  social protection have  included 
substituting  cash  transfers  for  food  aid during  recent 
food crises and experimenting with technology‑based 
delivery mechanisms, but otherwise the standard 
approach to humanitarian intervention has remained 
unchallenged.
In  Ethiopia  the  ‘old  safety  nets’  instruments  of 
public  works  for  the  ‘able‑bodied’  and unconditional 
transfers  for  the  ‘labour‑constrained’  continue  to  domi‑
nate.  The  main innovations  in  Ethiopia’s  ‘Productive 
Safety  Net  Programme’  (PSNP)  are  an  attempt  to 
substitute cash wages for food rations on public works, 
and to make predictable transfers to  households  over 
an  extended  period  (6 months  per  year  up  to  5  years) 
rather  than unpredictable,  sporadic  and  truncated. 
The  reasons  for  both  these  design  innovations bear 
directly on agricultural growth: predictable cash  transfers 
are expected  to stimulate investment in rural livelihoods 
(mainly agriculture), spending of cash transfers is 
expected to promote rural employment and income 
multipliers, and sizeable injections of cash into poor 
communities are expected to facilitate market integra‑
tion and price stabilisation. Both ambitions have been 
under‑achieved. During the second year of PSNP imple‑
mentation, 1.8 million participants switched from cash 
back to food, partly because food prices were rising while 
cash  transfers were constant, and PSNP cash  transfers 
were held partly responsible for food price inflation. Also, 
the intention of providing regular cash transfers to the 
same households over several years has been thwarted 
by political pressure to expand coverage and to ‘graduate’ 
participants off the programme as rapidly as possible, 
leading to dilution of transfers and rotation of partici‑
pants after only 1‑2 years.
‘Emergency  cash  transfers’  and  ‘productive  safety 
nets’  epitomise  the  evolving  social protection  agenda 
in  Africa,  which  has  become  dominated  by  social 
transfers  in  recent years, specifically by unconditional 
cash transfers which are displacing food aid (including 
project food aid such as school feeding and food‑for‑work) 
as the instrument of choice for influential donors. Much 
of this new agenda has focused on delivering social assist‑
ance to ‘vulnerable groups’ whose defining characteristic 
and source of vulnerability is lack of labour capacity 
(young children, older people, people with disabilities 
and chronic illness). In terms of targeting social safety 
nets, there is often a confusion between ‘chronic’ and 
‘transitory’ vulnerability, with emergency interventions 
following a drought or flood tending to identify not 
farmers whose crops were destroyed as most  ‘at risk’, 
but female‑headed households, orphans, the infirm and 
others whose vulnerability may be more severe, but is 
independent of the livelihood shock that triggered the 
humanitarian intervention. 
There  is  persuasive  evidence  that  social  transfers 
have  positive  spin‑offs  for  agriculture, even if farmers 
are not the transfer recipients. In all African countries 
where social pensions have been  introduced  (South 
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland), a 
consistent finding  is  that some pension  income  is spent 
on purchasing  inputs  (fertiliser, seeds) and hiring  labour. 
But  this  is a serendipitous side‑effect – social pensions 
are not  targeted at farmers and most social transfers are 
intended to protect consumption, not to be invested in 
production. Despite the growing (donor–led) interest in 
managing risk and vulnerability under an expanded 
poverty reduction agenda, the new social protection 
agenda has delivered very little for African farmers.
Social Protection to Support 
Agricultural Growth in 
Africa
Although social safety nets are often characterised as 
‘welfarist’ mechanisms  that simply protect  subsistence 
consumption,  there  are many ways  in which  various 
forms  of  social transfers or social protection can 
contribute to agricultural growth, directly and indirectly. 
As an analytical device, Amartya Sen’s ‘entitlement 
approach’ provides a useful disaggregation of the sources 
of food in rural households (Sen 1981), and social protec‑
tion mechanisms can be broadly classified according to 
the primary category of entitlement that they are 
designed to support (see Figure 1). This section of the 
paper discusses selected options available to poli‑
cy‑makers, under each of these four entitlement 
categories. 
Social protection support to agricultural 
production
There  are  unresolved  questions  about  the  boundaries 
between  social  protection  policies and agricultural 
policies – where does ‘livelihood protection’ end and 
‘livelihood promotion’ begin? This fuzziness is compli‑
cated by the reality that rural African households function 
as indivisible production and consumption units, so that 
resources transferred for one purpose are  fully  fungible 
and can be allocated  to other purposes  (food aid can 
be exchanged  for fertiliser just as easily as subsidised 
fertiliser can be sold for food). The implication is that 
social protection and agricultural policies should be 
regarded not as “parallel” policy arenas but as 
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“complementary domains” (Holmes et al. 2007). 
Recognising the interconnectedness of  domestic  and 
productive  spheres  in  rural Africa,  for  purposes  of  this 
paper  a  broad definition of social protection  is apposite 
– such as “policies and actions that protect and promote 
the livelihoods and welfare of poor and vulnerable 
people” (as adopted by Malawi’s Social Protection 
Technical Committee in 2006) – which would logically 
include the subsidised delivery of agricultural inputs to 
poor and vulnerable farmers.
The case for ‘productivity enhancing safety nets’ is 
simply that there are two ways to address food gaps in 
subsistence‑oriented farming households – reducing 
food production deficits by  enhancing  access  to  inputs, 
or  bridging  consumption  deficits  with  social  transfers 
–  and that the former strategy is demonstrably prefer‑
able to the latter (Devereux 2007). For economically 
active poor people such as farmers, social transfers should 
be introduced as a last resort, only after all efforts at 
raising returns to land and labour have been exhausted. 
This ‘pre‑emptive’ approach has the additional advantage 
of reducing the need for emergency relief when harvests 
are inadequate – an example of positive ‘macro‑level 
synergies’ between agriculture and social protection, as 
noted above. An instructive case study of ‘productivity 
enhancing  safety nets’  is  the delivery of  fertiliser  and 
seeds  to  farmers  in Malawi,  either free (‘Starter Packs’ 
and the ‘Targeted Input Programme’) or subsidised (the 
‘Input Subsidy Programme’).
Interventions  to support  farmer access  to  inputs  in 
Malawi have come  full circle  in  three decades, from 
input subsidies to zero support to free input distribution 
and back to input subsidies.  In  the  1970s  and  1980s 
input  subsidies  were  deployed  to  promote  national 
self‑sufficiency in maize and generation of export earn‑
ings from the tobacco estates. A series of economic 
shocks  in  the 1980s  forced cutbacks  in government 
spending and opened a policy space for the World Bank 
and IMF to impose unpopular reforms, including the 
Fertiliser Subsidy  Removal  Programme  (FSRP).  This, 
together  with  dramatic  price  rises  following several 
currency devaluations, resulted in restricted access to 
inputs which contributed to rising food insecurity during 
the 1990s. One survey found that households whose 
access to fertiliser declined  in the 1990s had average 
consumption  levels that were 13%  lower than other 
households (Hoddinott 2005). 
In 1998, the government (supported by certain donors 
such as DFID) started delivering free ‘Starter  Packs’ of 
improved  seeds  and  fertilisers  to  all 2.8 million  farming 
households  in Malawi. Apart  from  contributing  signifi‑
cantly  to  food  production  –  adding  an  estimated 
100‑150kg of maize  to household granaries and 16%  to 
the national maize harvest  in  its best year – Starter Packs 
helped dampen the maize price rises that cause seasonal 
hunger. Compared to other social transfers, the Starter 
Pack was very cost‑effective, costing about the same each 
year as general fertiliser subsidies (US$ 20m), but much 
less than equivalent volumes of food aid (US$100m), 
commercial food imports (US$ 70‑100m) or uncondi‑
tional cash transfers (US$ 107m) (Levy 2005). Nonetheless, 
this universal programme was scaled down to a ‘Targeted 
Input Programme’ (TIP) that reached one million house‑
holds in 2001, just before the famine of 2002 which was 
triggered by bad weather but exacerbated – according 
to the Government – by the cutback in inputs delivery.
In 2005 the Government of Malawi reintroduced subsi‑
dies on fertiliser and seeds, not as a general price support 
but in the form of targeted coupons that reduced retail 
prices by two‑thirds and were given to 45% of small‑
holder households. The programme had a food security 
objective: to raise maize yields to reduce the annual 
hunger gap and seasonal food insecurity among poor 
farming families. An evaluation concluded that national 
maize production was significantly boosted by the 
subsidy (Dorward et al. 2007). Though donors were 
antipathetic initially – it was financed entirely by the 
Government in its first year – the success of the input 
subsidy prompted some buy‑in from Malawi’s develop‑
ment partners in the second year. The programme already 
has such political momentum that it looks extremely 
difficult to remove, raising questions about its financial 
sustainability in the absence of an exit strategy.
Social protection responses to rural labour 
market failure
Public works programmes serve as ‘employment‑based 
safety nets’ that transfer commodities (food,  cash,  some‑
times  agricultural  inputs)  to people who  are  under‑em‑
ployed  and  food insecure, notably smallholder families 
whose harvests are inadequate for self‑sufficiency and 
Figure 1. Social protection mechanisms to support agriculture–based livelihoods
Entitlement category Intervention categories Social protection responses
Production– based ‘Productivity-• enhancing safety  •
nets’
Free input distribution  •
Input subsidies  •
Input fairs (seeds, fertilisers) •
Labour– based Public works programmes •
Guaranteed employment •
Cash–for–work • Food–for–work  •
Employment guarantee schemes •
Trade–based Control of food supplies •
Control of food prices •
Open market operations •
Price hedging (futures markets)  •
Food price subsidies •
Transfer–based Cash transfers •
Food aid •
Social insurance •
Unconditional cash transfers  •
Emergency food aid  •
Weather–indexed insurance •
Source:  Adapted from Devereux (2007: 48)
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face hunger due to lack of alternative employment or 
savings. Public works is a controversial instrument, 
because each of its posited advantages is associated with 
a negative side‑effect. For instance, public works aims 
to achieve consumption smoothing by being imple‑
mented during the hungry season – but this is also the 
farming season, so requiring hungry people to work for 
transfers at this time of year competes directly with labour 
requirements on their own farm, and risks setting up a 
vicious cycle of under‑production, dependence on public 
works employment, neglect of own farm, and further 
under‑production.
Secondly,  public works  is  favoured  by  administrators 
who  hold  negative  perceptions  of the poor as feckless 
and opportunistic, so imposing a heavy work require‑
ment and paying low wages  is seen as ensuring  ‘self‑tar‑
geting’, since only  the poorest and most desperate would 
register  for  such unattractive work. But  this  is a  coun‑
ter‑productive  (and ethically questionable) approach, 
since much of the energy that is transferred to workers 
in the form of food rations or cash wages will be expended 
on manual labour, greatly reducing the net benefit of 
the (small) transfers. Also on targeting, the labour require‑
ment on public works obviously excludes the labour 
constrained – whose inability to work might well place 
them among  the destitute and most vulnerable members 
of  the  community. Although  there  is much talk of 
introducing work with low labour requirements for the 
labour‑constrained (eg asking older people or people 
with physical disabilities to look after the children of 
workers on public works projects), this rarely happens 
in practice and where it does, provides only a nominal 
number of workplaces.
Thirdly, since public works are often  introduced  in 
response  to  food  insecurity, payment has  typically 
been made  in  food  rations,  but  ‘food‑for‑work’ does 
not  necessarily  reflect participants’ preferences, and is 
inappropriate if the food is imported and local markets 
are functioning well. In Malawi, public works participants 
in Malawi expressed a preference for seasonally disag‑
gregated payment modalities, with cash being the main 
need around harvest, food being preferred during the 
‘hungry season’ months, and inputs being requested 
during the planting season. Although this would require 
an unprecedented degree of flexibility and responsive‑
ness by donors and project administrators, ‘inputs‑for‑work’ 
has been piloted in Malawi, where it was positively evalu‑
ated as a mechanism for alleviating input constraints for 
smallholders (CARE et al. 2004).
Fourthly, public works is justified as employment crea‑
tion that creates useful assets, but in reality the assets 
constructed or maintained on public works are typically 
flawed in various ways. Since the primary objective is to 
transfer resources to poor and food insecure people, the 
proportion of project budgets allocated to training, tools 
and equipment, quality control and supervision is 
minimal, so the quality of the assets is seriously deficient. 
Often public works are  intended to create assets that 
will contribute directly or  indirectly to enhanced agri‑
cultural production or marketing (soil and water conser‑
vation, terracing, micro‑irrigation), but there are relatively 
few successes to report. More often than not, public 
works assets are poorly maintained and deteriorate 
rapidly after the project ends, leaving no discernible 
benefit behind.
Many  problems  typical  of  public  works  were  expe‑
rienced  in  Namibia’s  food‑for‑work programme during 
the southern African drought of 1991. Two‑thirds of these 
activities were large‑scale public works, each employing 
70+ people and creating physical  infrastructure (water 
pipelines,  teachers’  houses).  The  remaining  one‑third 
of  activities  were  income‑generating  (vegetable 
gardens,  brick‑making),  each  employing  about  20 
people.  Despite heavy  investment  in  training  and 
equipment,  most  of  these  projects  collapsed  soon 
after  food deliveries were  terminated. Assets deterio‑
rated and  income generation  ceased, suggesting that 
food aid was the main motivation for participants. 
Food‑for‑work coverage was extremely low, at 7% of the 
target group, against 87% coverage by free food distribu‑
tion. The main  explanation  for  this poor performance 
was  an over‑ambitious  expectation  that food‑for‑work 
could be used to pursue multiple goals – not just imme‑
diate drought relief, but also sustainable long‑term 
income generation in poor rural communities – and a 
failure to appreciate that public works are complex 
employment creation programmes.
Although this discussion has argued against public 
works as they are commonly implemented, there is a 
place for employment‑based safety nets in rural Africa, 
provided certain principles are followed that have been 
conspicuously absent to date. Pre‑eminent among these 
is that effective employment‑based safety nets must be 
demand‑driven rather than supply‑driven. The best 
model comes from outside Africa, from the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) in India and its 
recent scaling up to the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA), which guarantees every rural 
Indian household 100 days of employment each year at 
the minimum wage, or a cash transfer if the state cannot 
provide employment within a  reasonable  time  and 
distance  from  the  applicant’s home.  Early  studies of 
MEGS  found that  the guarantee of paid work on demand 
encouraged moderate risk‑taking by  farmers, and  that 
the  objectives  of  consumption  and  income  smoothing 
were  achieved. Ravallion (1990) found that income vari‑
ability halved in villages where employment was guar‑
anteed, compared to villages with no such safety net.
Finally, if public works are to contribute to agricultural 
growth, other changes in design are also needed. Instead 
of paying  ‘low wages’ for self‑targeting purposes,  ‘fair 
wages’ should be  paid  that  transfer meaningful  income 
to  support  both  consumption  smoothing  and agri‑
cultural investment. ‘Decent work’ principles should be 
applied. The timing and labour demands of public works 
should complement rather than conflict with agricultural 
labour demands. Assets created under public works 
should be selected  in  full consultation with programme 
participants,  they  should  explicitly  support  agricultural 
and  non‑agricultural livelihoods wherever  possible,  and 
effective  institutions  for maintenance  of  these  assets 
must be introduced (Devereux 2002). 
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Social protection responses to commodity 
market failures
Vulnerability in agricultural communities is exacerbated 
by weaknesses in rural commodity markets, exemplified 
by food prices that double or treble between the harvest 
season and the ‘hungry season’ 8‑9 months later, and by 
collapses in asset prices over the same period. In Malawi, 
for instance: “In normal years, farmers sell maize at harvest 
time when the price is low and buy back during the lean 
period when prices are high. In general, the price differ‑
ential is about 50 to 100%” (FEWSNET 2005: 2). In a bad 
year like 2005, retail maize prices increase by a factor of 
3 or more – in the famine year of 2002, prices in some 
rural markets were 6‑8 times higher in the hungry season 
than after the preceding harvest.
Crisis  years  or  difficult  ‘hungry  seasons’  are  associ‑
ated  with  decapitalisation  in  rural households, as food 
insecure families are forced into ‘distress sales’ of assets 
to raise cash for subsistence needs. Liquidating assets 
is a standard behavioural response to  livelihood stress, 
and empirical studies of  ‘coping strategies’  in the 1980s 
found that asset disposal followed a predictable and 
logical sequence (Corbett 1988), with consumer goods 
(such as radios or  ‘off‑take’  livestock) being sold  first 
and productive assets  (such as ploughs and draught 
animals) being sold later. Assets that are indispensable 
for production (eg farmland) are  sold  last,  only when 
the  alternative  is  severe malnutrition,  or  death.  These 
‘survival strategies’  severely  compromise  the  house‑
hold’s  ability  to  pursue  a  viable  livelihood  in future, 
and are often followed by ‘distress migration’ off the land 
and the abandonment of  agriculture ‑based 
livelihoods.
Even  in  a  ‘normal’  year,  asset  sales  for  food  is  a 
standard  response  to  food  production deficits, with 
livestock being kept as a form of savings by rural house‑
holds with no access to financial  intermediation services. 
A survey  in Ethiopia  in 2006, a year of above average 
food production, found that 23% of 960 rural respondents 
sold some livestock, 6% sold other assets (including 
productive assets such as farm tools) and 1% rented out 
some or all of their farmland, to buy food (Devereux et 
al. 2006). The problem with this strategy is that the terms 
of  trade between assets and  food move sharply against 
assets during  the hungry season, as asset prices fall (a 
buyer’s market due to excess supply) and food prices 
rise (a seller’s market due to excess demand). During the 
Malawi famine of 2002, a survey asked affected house‑
holds about the selling price of any assets they sold or 
exchanged for food or cash to buy food, and for how 
much they could have sold these assets in the year before 
the crisis. For instance, one household reported selling 
a bicycle with a replacement cost of MK 800 for MK 150. 
Compiling these responses across 1,200 households 
indicated that an average loss of 53% in asset values was 
incurred due to ‘distress sales’ (Devereux et al. 2003: 
62).
Social protection for rural Africans must include mech‑
anisms for protecting household assets against food price 
inflation, specifically against ‘distress sales’ of assets at 
under‑valued prices. This can be achieved either by inter‑
vening directly in commodity markets, or by ensuring 
that vulnerable households have alternative sources of 
food or income. As discussed above, direct interven‑
tionism in grain markets was the approach preferred by 
African governments before reforms associated with 
agricultural liberalisation were adopted. Mechanisms 
included ‘open market operations’  such as grain  reserve 
management, and pricing policies  such as  food price 
subsidies or legislated price bands. The Ghana Food 
Distribution Corporation (GFDC), for instance, operation‑
alised its food security mandate by buying up grain 
surpluses after harvest at low prices, storing it for several 
months then selling it at cost price (purchase plus storage) 
on local markets when prices started rising and farmers’ 
granaries were depleted, thereby boosting food supplies 
and smoothing price seasonality.
Some established interventions to control national 
food supplies remain on the policy menu, such as the 
maintenance by governments of strategic grain reserves 
that are depleted and replenished  according  to  needs. 
However, mismanagement  of  grain  reserves  is  common, 
and has contributed in the past to avoidable food crises 
in Africa (eg in Zimbabwe in 1991, Ethiopia  in  2000, 
Malawi  in  2002). Also, donors  increasingly  argue  that 
holding physical stocks of food is expensive and ineffi‑
cient, and innovative alternatives have recently been 
devised and trialled, such as the use of futures markets 
to guarantee timely food supplies at  affordable  prices 
through  hedging  arrangements  (Dana  et  al.  2005).  In 
2005,  Malawi purchased a call option on maize on the 
South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX), at a price of 
US$25 that saved US$60‑90 per ton  imported, and called 
on this option to supplement domestic grain supplies 
after a poor harvest raised the risk of famine (Alderman 
and Haque 2006: 18).
Government interventions to control  food prices are 
unlikely to return to the policy menu in the immediate 
future, despite the fact that the abolition of price subsi‑
dies reintroduced grain price seasonality, which is a major 
source of food insecurity in poor rural households, 
responsible for  acute malnutrition  as well  as  disposal 
of  productive  assets  and  under‑investment  in agricul‑
ture. Instead of interfering with market prices, indirect 
methods of protecting farmers’ assets are  likely  to 
become  increasingly popular. These  include  innovative 
approaches  to insurance and the expanded delivery of 
social transfers, which are discussed next.
Social protection as social safety nets for 
farmers
The  importance  of  social  safety  nets  or  a  guaranteed 
minimum  income,  not  only  for humanitarian  impera‑
tives  but  also  for  underpinning  moderate  risk‑taking 
and  driving economic growth, has been  recognised by 
economists  for centuries.  In  the 1800s, Turgot argued 
that  poverty  and  vulnerability  to  subsistence  crises 
are  inimical  to  risk‑taking, entrepreneurship and the 
evolution of stable markets. More recently, Michael 
Lipton argued that  safety  nets  are  “needed,  both  to 
mitigate  the  vulnerability  (to  droughts  and  floods, 
illnesses and twins) of the working poor, and to compen‑
sate those too old or  ill  to work; such security, indeed, 
can stimulate entrepreneurship and growth” (Lipton 
1997: 1004).
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Social transfers, in the form of either food or cash, can 
raise or smooth food consumption in poor households 
and protect their assets against liquidation to meet 
subsistence needs. Dercon  and  Krishnan  (2000)  found 
that  food  aid  effectively  reduced  the  vulnerability of 
households  in  rural  Ethiopia. Despite widespread 
hostility  to  food  aid  and  a  growing preference  for 
cash  transfers  among  sections within  the donor 
community,  the  criticism that food aid causes disincen‑
tives and dependency among beneficiaries has recently 
been subjected  to critical empirical scrutiny which 
concludes  that  these putative effects might have been 
overstated, especially among the poorest Dayton‑Johnson 
and Hoddinott (2004) found that disincentive effects of 
food aid in Ethiopia were correlated with household 
wealth, and were insignificant among the poor. A review 
of food aid by Barrett and Maxwell (2005) reached a 
number of significant conclusions, including the 
following.
Food aid rarely induces dependency, because food  •
transfers are too small and unpredictable  to affect 
beneficiary behaviour. (Crudely, one implication is that 
farmers are unlikely to stop farming in the expectation 
that food aid will compensate for their failed 
harvests.)
Food aid that accurately targets the rural poor has  •
negligible price effects on local markets,  since these 
households are already priced out of the market.
Food  aid  can  undermine  local  food  production  and  •
labour  markets,  for  instance  if  imported food crowds 
out demand for local produce and induces farmers to 
switch to non‑food crops.
It follows that food aid should be sourced locally when‑ •
ever possible, to minimise negative  side‑effects and 
maximise incentives to local production and trade. 
Cash  transfers  are  claimed  to  be  preferable  to  food 
transfers  on  a  number  of  grounds. Cash  is cheaper  to 
administer and deliver  than commodities  (Creti and 
Jaspars 2006: 10), and is less paternalistic because it 
facilitates choice. Cash transfers contribute to pro‑poor 
economic growth because they are spent (creating 
income and employment multipliers) and invested 
(notably  in agricultural and non‑agricultural  livelihoods) 
– a study of emergency cash  transfers  in Malawi esti‑
mated a  regional economic multiplier of 2.1–2.5  (Davies 
and Davey, 2008). Finally, cash transfers can stimulate 
markets and trade by boosting purchasing power and 
effective demand.
On the other hand, given the volatility of food supplies 
and prices, especially during periods of food stress, there 
is a risk that cash transfers will simply fuel food price 
inflation, or will purchase less food than intended as 
prices rise. One option is to index‑link seasonal safety 
nets or emergency cash transfers to food prices, so that 
a constant entitlement to food is guaranteed at any price. 
This  innovative approach was  implemented by an NGO 
(Concern Worldwide) during district‑level food crises  in 
Malawi  in 2006 and 2007, and successfully protected 
household food consumption and assets compared to 
non‑beneficiary households (Devereux et al. 2007).
In emergency contexts, cash is mostly spent on food 
and is consumed (unless it is mis‑targeted), but even 
then, comparative analysis reveals that cash is allocated 
to more diverse purposes than is food aid. Some propor‑
tion of cash transfers is invariably allocated to investment 
in assets (eg small livestock) and agricultural inputs (eg 
seed, fertiliser, or renting land). This suggests  that  recipi‑
ents are  trading off pressures  to meet  immediate 
consumption needs against  ambitions  to  accumulate 
assets  for  future  consumption  and  income  generation. 
Cash transfers can therefore be understood as supporting 
both ‘livelihood protection’ and ‘livelihood promotion’ 
objectives 
All these positive effects are more pronounced when 
cash transfers are predictable, regular and  sustained, 
such  as  social  pensions  that  are  disbursed monthly 
to  older  citizens  in several African  countries. Alternatively, 
a  credible  assurance  that  social  transfers will be 
provided when needed can also encourage farmers to 
invest in yield‑enhancing technologies, inputs and 
productive assets. This implies ‘guaranteed’ social safety 
nets (such as legislated employment guarantees) or cred‑
ible social insurance (such as weather‑indexed agricul‑
tural insurance schemes).
Despite these multiple benefits of cash transfers, two 
cautionary caveats should be noted. Firstly, while the 
micro‑level impacts of cash transfers are well docu‑
mented and accepted, claims  that  cash  transfers  can 
contribute  to  macro‑level  economic  growth  and 
poverty reduction are not well substantiated empirically; 
more rigorous evidence building is needed. Secondly, 
cash can provide the oil to turn the wheels of the rural 
economy – but the wheels must first be in place. 
(Stretching this metaphor, social transfers and social 
insurance can act as shock absorbers that cushion the 
drivers of the car against potholes, which is important 
to  protect  the  car  against  breaking  down)  Cash  trans‑
fers  can  stimulate  investment  and trade, but they 
cannot, on their own, construct the essential infrastruc‑
ture and institutions (roads, markets,  etc)  that African 
farmers  need  for  viable  and  growing  rural  livelihoods. 
Complementary agricultural and rural development poli‑
cies and interventions are urgently needed to break rural 
poverty traps and “get agriculture moving”.
Conclusion
Most  small  farmers  in Africa  operate  in  a  debilitating 
and  stressful  environment  of  low productivity and high 
vulnerability. This presents obvious needs for holistic 
social protection that both protects and promotes 
farmers’ livelihoods, by managing agricultural risk, 
protecting productive assets and raising farm yields. 
These objectives can be partially achieved through 
targeted social safety nets – preferably  in  the  form of 
social  insurance  rather  than social assistance  – but 
safety nets  are not  enough,  and  synergies with  agri‑
cultural policies  and broader policy arenas must be 
maximised. A six‑point policy agenda for providing syner‑
gistic support for poor African farmers was set out earlier 
in this paper, and is repeated here: 
Get inputs to farmers on time and at affordable  •
prices. 
Strengthen rural markets to stabilise commodity  •
prices, especially of staple foods. 
Build essential rural infrastructure and enabling  •
institutions.
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Insure  vulnerable  farmers  against  agricultural  risk,  •
for  instance  with  innovative mechanisms such as 
weather‑indexed  insurance schemes and guaranteed 
employment legislation.
Move away from imported food aid towards local  •
sourcing and/or cash transfers wherever  local markets 
and cultural contexts (specifically gender relations) 
permit this.
Declare a moratorium on small‑scale ‘pilot projects’  •
and support permanent national social  protection 
programmes  that are  integrated  into broader agri‑
cultural and development policies.
Some of this agenda might be classified as ‘agricultural 
policy’ rather than ‘social protection’, but defining these 
labels and boundaries is less important than tackling the 
chronic problems of  low agricultural productivity and 
high agricultural  risk  in Africa  in a coordinated way, 
with all  the policy  instruments available,  including  the 
innovative mechanisms associated with the ‘new social 
protection agenda’. Finally, however, continual cycles of 
identifying and piloting innovative ideas will not lead to 
sustainable agricultural growth and wide‑ranging 
poverty reduction. The priority is to put in place policies 
and mechanisms that are effective, comprehensive, cred‑
ible and ultimately enforceable, and this requires empow‑
ering African farmers rather than experimenting with 
them.
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